PRESS CONFERENCE

Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB,
Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the ECB

Frankfurt am Main, 5 June 2025

Good afternoon, the Vice-President and I welcome you to our press conference.

The Governing Council today decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance – is based on our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Inflation is currently at around our two per cent medium-term target. In the baseline of the new Eurosystem staff projections, headline inflation is set to average 2.0 per cent in 2025, 1.6 per cent in 2026 and 2.0 per cent in 2027. The downward revisions compared with the March projections, by 0.3 percentage points for both 2025 and 2026, mainly reflect lower assumptions for energy prices and a stronger euro. Staff expect inflation excluding energy and food to average 2.4 per cent in 2025 and 1.9 per cent in 2026 and 2027, broadly unchanged since March.

Staff see real GDP growth averaging 0.9 per cent in 2025, 1.1 per cent in 2026 and 1.3 per cent in 2027. The unrevised growth projection for 2025 reflects a stronger than expected first quarter combined with weaker prospects for the remainder of the year. While the uncertainty surrounding trade policies is expected to weigh on business investment and exports, especially in the short term, rising government investment in defence and infrastructure will increasingly support growth over the medium term. Higher real incomes and a robust labour market will allow households to spend more. Together with more favourable financing conditions, this should make the economy more resilient to global shocks.

In the context of high uncertainty, staff also assessed some of the mechanisms by which different trade policies could affect growth and inflation under some alternative illustrative scenarios. These scenarios will be published with the staff projections on our website. Under this scenario analysis, a further escalation of trade tensions over the coming months would result in growth and inflation being below the baseline projections. By contrast, if trade tensions were resolved with a benign outcome, growth and, to a lesser extent, inflation would be higher than in the baseline projections.

Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our two per cent medium-term target on a sustained basis. Wage growth is still elevated but continues to moderate visibly, and profits are partially buffering its impact on inflation. The concerns that increased uncertainty and a volatile market response to the trade tensions in April would have a tightening impact on financing conditions have eased.

We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our two per cent medium-term target. Especially in current conditions of exceptional uncertainty, we will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. Our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path.

The decisions taken today are set out in a press release available on our website.

I will now outline in more detail how we see the economy and inflation developing and will then explain our assessment of financial and monetary conditions.

Economic activity

The economy grew by 0.3 per cent in the first quarter of 2025, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate. Unemployment, at 6.2 per cent in April, is at its lowest level since the launch of the euro, and employment grew by 0.3 per cent in the first quarter of the year, according to the flash estimate.

In line with the staff projections, survey data point overall to some weaker prospects in the near term. While manufacturing has strengthened, partly because trade has been brought forward in anticipation of higher tariffs, the more domestically oriented services sector is slowing. Higher tariffs and a stronger euro are expected to make it harder for firms to export. High uncertainty is expected to weigh on investment.

At the same time, several factors are keeping the economy resilient and should support growth over the medium term. A strong labour market, rising real incomes, robust private sector balance sheets and easier financing conditions, in part because of our past interest rate cuts, should all help consumers and firms withstand the fallout from a volatile global environment. Recently announced measures to step up defence and infrastructure investment should also bolster growth.

In the present geopolitical environment, it is even more urgent for fiscal and structural policies to make the euro area economy more productive, competitive and resilient. The European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass provides a concrete roadmap for action, and its proposals, including on simplification, should be swiftly adopted. This includes completing the savings and investment union, following a clear and ambitious timetable. It is also important to rapidly establish the legislative framework to prepare the ground for the potential introduction of a digital euro. Governments should ensure sustainable public finances in line with the EU’s economic governance framework, while prioritising essential growth-enhancing structural reforms and strategic investment.

Inflation

Annual inflation declined to 1.9 per cent in May, from 2.2 per cent in April, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate. Energy price inflation remained at -3.6 per cent. Food price inflation rose to 3.3 per cent, from 3.0 per cent the month before. Goods inflation was unchanged at 0.6 per cent, while services inflation dropped to 3.2 per cent, from 4.0 per cent in April. Services inflation had jumped in April mainly because prices for travel services around the Easter holidays went up by more than expected.

Most indicators of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will stabilise sustainably at our two per cent medium-term target. Labour costs are gradually moderating, as indicated by incoming data on negotiated wages and available country data on compensation per employee. The ECB’s wage tracker points to a further easing of negotiated wage growth in 2025, while the staff projections see wage growth falling to below 3 per cent in 2026 and 2027. While lower energy prices and a stronger euro are putting downward pressure on inflation in the near term, inflation is expected to return to target in 2027.

Short-term consumer inflation expectations edged up in April, likely reflecting news about trade tensions. But most measures of longer-term inflation expectations continue to stand at around 2 per cent, which supports the stabilisation of inflation around our target.

Risk assessment

Risks to economic growth remain tilted to the downside. A further escalation in global trade tensions and associated uncertainties could lower euro area growth by dampening exports and dragging down investment and consumption. A deterioration in financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions and greater risk aversion, and make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, remain a major source of uncertainty. By contrast, if trade and geopolitical tensions were resolved swiftly, this could lift sentiment and spur activity. A further increase in defence and infrastructure spending, together with productivity-enhancing reforms, would also add to growth.

The outlook for euro area inflation is more uncertain than usual, as a result of the volatile global trade policy environment. Falling energy prices and a stronger euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced if higher tariffs led to lower demand for euro area exports and to countries with overcapacity rerouting their exports to the euro area. Trade tensions could lead to greater volatility and risk aversion in financial markets, which would weigh on domestic demand and would thereby also lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could raise inflation by pushing up import prices and adding to capacity constraints in the domestic economy. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also raise inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

Financial and monetary conditions

Risk-free interest rates have remained broadly unchanged since our last meeting. Equity prices have risen, and corporate bond spreads have narrowed, in response to more positive news about global trade policies and the improvement in global risk sentiment.

Our past interest rate cuts continue to make corporate borrowing less expensive. The average interest rate on new loans to firms declined to 3.8 per cent in April, from 3.9 per cent in March. The cost of issuing market-based debt was unchanged at 3.7 per cent. Bank lending to firms continued to strengthen gradually, growing by an annual rate of 2.6 per cent in April after 2.4 per cent in March, while corporate bond issuance was subdued. The average interest rate on new mortgages stayed at 3.3 per cent in April, while growth in mortgage lending increased to 1.9 per cent.

In line with our monetary policy strategy, the Governing Council thoroughly assessed the links between monetary policy and financial stability. While euro area banks remain resilient, broader financial stability risks remain elevated, in particular owing to highly uncertain and volatile global trade policies. Macroprudential policy remains the first line of defence against the build-up of financial vulnerabilities, enhancing resilience and preserving macroprudential space.

Conclusion

The Governing Council today decided to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, the decision to lower the deposit facility rate – the rate through which we steer the monetary policy stance – is based on our updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our two per cent medium-term target. Especially in current conditions of exceptional uncertainty, we will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. Our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path.

In any case, we stand ready to adjust all of our instruments within our mandate to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission.

We are now ready to take your questions.

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The first question is on rates: has anyone today advocated either pausing rate cuts or cutting by a bigger 50 basis points? And would you say that after today’s rate cut to 2%, a pause at the next meeting in July would make sense, also to wait for new projections in September? And the other question is not on the future of rates, but on your own future: WEF founder Klaus Schwab has said that you discussed leaving the ECB before the end of your term to lead the World Economic Forum. I know the ECB stated your determination to stay, but without an outright denial of these talks. Have these talks taken place or not? And have you contemplated leaving the ECB early?

I’ll start with the first question, which is really the order of business and the main topic today. We cut interest rates by 25 basis points. And with today’s cut, at the current level of interest rates, we believe that we are in a good position to navigate the uncertain conditions that will be coming up. So we are well-positioned to navigate those circumstances. I can also tell you that it was an almost unanimous decision. There was one Governing Council member who did not support the decision, but other than that it was virtually unanimous. So I would call it either very broad consensus or virtually unanimous support for the decision to cut by 25 basis points. And obviously we analysed the situation in the light of the three criteria that you know well because they are repeated several times in the monetary policy statement and have not varied for a number of meetings now. But under those three criteria, really the situation points towards inflation settling at our 2% target. We can come back to the path, but this is what we are seeing. And that is what has predicated the cut that we made today. Now, you asked me about my future, which is far less important than the future of the economy and the future of our monetary policy, rest assured. But I can very firmly tell you that I have always been and I’m fully determined to deliver on my mission and I’m determined to complete my term. So I regret to tell you that you’re not about to see the back of me.

When I read through the communiqué today, I have the feeling that you’re quite confident about the economy despite all the uncertainties. Is that the right assessment? And at the same time you’re also quite confident that inflation is under control. Does that bring me to the right conclusion that we’re almost done when it comes to rate cutting? And then a question on your thinking about the boost from the fiscal space because clearly it will take time until we’ll see that materialising on the economy and also probably on inflation. So just to also understand: why are you so confident that this is actually supporting the economy, also in the shorter term, despite all the uncertainties?

We have hardly revised our growth numbers. The only year we have slightly revised is 2026 and by -0.1 percentage points. So we have confirmed our projected growth rate as per our projection of last March at 0.9% for 2025. And that was certainly reinforced by the number we had for the first quarter. I mentioned the 0.3 first quarter number, which was, as you know, revised from an initial 0.4. I would not exclude that there be further revision of that number on the upside. This is attributable to multiple factors. It’s improved consumption, it’s improved investment, but more importantly it’s the build-up of inventory or anticipated purchases and therefore sales in fear and anticipation of the tariffs. So that first quarter is of course very particular and is clearly giving momentum to the growth that we are seeing and anticipating for 2025. But again, I would not exclude that that number of 0.3 be revised upward given the volume that we are seeing being traded out of some countries in particular. But we are not revising 2027 and we are very marginally revising 2026 because there is a carryover – number one – and because we believe that the impact of tariffs, if and when they materialise, on the export that we have towards the United States, which I remind you is only 17% of our total exports outside from the euro area and European countries, will impact predominantly 2026 and will then be significantly offset by the expected investment in both military equipment and construction or infrastructure, if you will, particularly out of some countries. So our assessment is that that will have a bearing on 2027 predominantly – some on 2026, but predominantly on 2027. So you have this offset between the two. Are we confident? I think that would be far-fetched. We are in a good place. As I said, I think we are well-positioned after that 25-basis-point rate cut, and with the rate path as it is, we are in a good place. We will face uncertainty. We do not know what the outcome of the negotiations will be between the various partners. We don’t know the level of retaliation that might be decided, which incidentally is not included in our baseline, as you will see published later on. And as a result, we have to be prepared and we will be assessing, meeting-by-meeting, data as they come in. But as I said again, we are well-positioned at the moment and the path of inflation that we see certainly returns to 2% in 2027. So we start from a place where we have inflation for 2025 at 2%. It goes below target in 2026 for reasons that have predominantly to do with the price of energy and the value of the euro because, as you know, it’s based on our current assumption of those prices now. And that’s what explains these numbers.

You said that the current level of rates leaves you in a good position. Are we to understand that as an indication that you’re done cutting interest rates? Or if I can rephrase the question in another way, what would you need to see for you to cut rates again?

Again, we are in a good position. And we are in a good position on the basis of the current rate path and with the 25-basis-point cut that we decided, so that we can face the uncertainties that are coming our way. But as you have heard in the monetary policy statement, we will decide meeting-by -meeting on the basis of data and we will assess, as and when data come in, whether or not that position is secure in order to deliver on our 2% medium-term target. What I’m saying today is that we are in that good position.

First question: would you say the monetary stance has now shifted to neutral or is it still restrictive even slightly? And second question: some countries are facing higher debt and may struggle to attract investors. At what point does that become a concern for the ECB in terms of policy transmission and financial stability?

We have not discussed this wonderful concept of the neutral rate on the occasion of this meeting. And I think that we all know well that as we are getting closer to that zone, we need to be particularly attentive. We need to be confident in our resolve to deliver with the appropriate monetary policy our medium-term 2% target. But we have not discussed that neutral rate, and I alluded to that at our last press conference. The neutral rate is predicated on the absence of shock: great equilibrium, no shock. I wish there was no shock, but we have just nearly concluded a cycle of monetary policy that dealt with a series of shocks – pandemic, war in Ukraine, energy crisis – and I think we have done that decently well. Inflation is at target 2% medium-term. We are currently around 2%. Expectations are well anchored around 2%. And those elements that I told you repeatedly over the few last press conferences were of concern to us, namely inflation on services, evolution of wages, evolution of profit, are coming really in line with what our projections were in order to deliver on our 2% medium-term target. For the moment, we are facing significant uncertainty. You will read in the monetary policy statement: I think we quote uncertainty nine or ten times. It abounds. There is plenty of that, and clearly we are trying to improve our game as much as we can in order to anticipate, measure and calibrate. But it’s proving obviously quite difficult. And that’s the reason you will be not only receiving our projection exercise, but also the scenarios which encapsulate some of the channels of transmission to growth and inflation. Some of them, not all of them. In particular, I would mention one that we discussed quite extensively during the Governing Council, which is the disruption of the supply chain. That is not included in any of our scenarios.

According to the ECB convergence report published on Wednesday, Bulgaria is ready to join the eurozone on 1 January next year. What do you expect to be the effects of Bulgaria accession to the euro area, and will the currency zone be stronger with the widely new Member State?

First of all, I would like to congratulate Bulgaria, the Bulgarian people and welcome them. This is not yet a completed decision-making process because, as you know, while the Commission and we have validated under the convergence report that the criteria are met, the European Council still has to approve. So I don’t want to prejudge what the European Council will decide, but there is a very strong likelihood that Bulgaria will become our 21st member around the table. And we are delighted that the circle gets larger. And we will be looking forward to the Bulgarian contributions, both in terms of intellectual input, economic analysis, monetary policy determination. And as soon as the decision is final with the European Council, as you probably know, we will welcome for several meetings before 1 January the Bulgarian representative at the table of the Governing Council in order to facilitate and do the onboarding properly. And so that we can also get to know a new colleague. I also hope that the Bulgarian people will value the solidity of the euro area and the solidity of the currency that we have. Some of you have probably noticed that the supportive judgement of the Europeans has gone up and is now at 83% in the euro area. So 83% of Europeans, based on the survey that is done on a regular basis, actually value and appreciate the euro as their currency. So I hope we can together do everything we can so that Bulgarians can also appreciate the value and the shield impact that the euro constitute for new members.

First question: some analysts have entertained the idea that you could skip July to make a concession to those Governing Council members who have already become reluctant to cut rates further. Could you walk us through today’s deliberations in this light? And my second question is: you have been reluctant to declare victory over inflation for quite some time. Is this the right time for a victory lap and, if not, why?

Victory laps are always nice, but there is always another battle. As I said, I think that with today’s cut and the current level of interest rates, number one, I think we are getting to the end of a monetary policy cycle that was responding to compounded shocks, including COVID, the illegitimate war in Ukraine and the energy crisis. But of course we are now into a different time with different players, with different partners, with different policies. And we will continue to analyse and assess and measure and make sure that we deliver on our 2% medium-term target. This is, in a way, the thing that is certain. You should not doubt for a second our determination to deliver with the appropriate monetary policy the 2% medium-term target. What we’re seeing currently with this 2% projected inflation for 2025, 2% for 2027 and 1.6% in 2026, caused predominantly with our current assumption on the price of energy and the value of the euro, is that we have a good path to this target. And we’ll make sure that it will be close navigation around our target. That's where we have to be and want to be.

My first question is on this concept of the direction of travel, which you earlier used in this rate cycle. Today’s remarks suggest to me that the direction of travel now probably is more a sideways movement rather than kind of a downward movement, as it was by the end of the year. Would that be the right takeaway from today’s remarks? And my second question again is on these remarks by Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum: some people suggest that the disclosure that you considered leaving the ECB early could undermine your ability to do your job properly, as you might be seen as a lame duck. What would be your response to those concerns?

On your first question, the reason I use the direction of travel concept was when we were really at a distance from our medium-term 2% target. So to talk about the direction of travel when we have our medium-term 2% target in sight – sustainably so – and when underlying inflation is not budging. For those in doubt, headline inflation in 2026 is clearly oil and gas and the value of the euro, which we assess at the time when we cut off the period when the staff does its assessment. Underlying inflation or core inflation is hardly moving and it’s at around our target. So there’s no point talking about the direction of travel. There’s no point talking about sideways. What I’m saying is that we will be determined to deliver that 2% medium-term target. We will be looking at all data that come in. We will be deciding meeting-by-meeting. And we will constantly assess and reassess how we are delivering on this 2% medium-term target. As to your second question, I will repeat what I have said. I have always been driven by my mandate and I’m determined to complete my term. Period.

I have two questions. One is on APP and PEPP in the sense that the ECB no longer reinvests the principal payments of these portfolios. Would the Governing Council have to put on hold quantitative tightening if it were to decide for a pause in interest rate cuts? Even if these investments have a very small impact, keeping interest rates unchanged during QT is somehow a restrictive stance, as the ECB is draining liquidity. And my second question is on the role of the euro: the Governor of Banca d’Italia, Fabio Panetta, warned in his speech on 30 May in his concluding remarks that the recent US depreciation raised important questions about the future structure of the international monetary system and the dominant role of the US dollar as both a reserve and a trade invoicing currency. I would be very interested to know your opinion, given your vast and very important special experience in the United States. What do you think is happening now with the dollar? And also what could be the implications for us, for the role of the euro and hopefully also euro-denominated safe assets?

On your first question, while I appreciate that some of you would like to hear me talk about pause, hold or whatever, I just can repeat myself that we are currently well-positioned to navigate the uncertainties of the next months. And I think the risk of inconsistency of QT associated with interest rate policy, which is our main tool, is probably less critical in the event – which I’m not confirming here now – of a pause than it is in the event of a cut. So I don’t see that, but neither do I say anything about future decisions, which would only be predicated on major shocks that we are not seeing at the moment. On the role of the euro, I highly regard the speech that was given by my colleague and friend, Governor Panetta. And I happen to be very much on the same page as he is. I gave a speech in Berlin about ten days ago now at the Hertie School of the Jacques Delors Institute, in which I tried to identify the key pillars that would need to be consolidated and further developed if the euro was to play a critical role as an international reserve currency. And my conclusion is that there is an opportunity, which is opening now, to strengthen the role of the euro as an international currency as to take it further towards possibly the international reserve currency of choice. But my conclusion is that it is not going to be granted to us. It should not be taken as a given, and it will require in particular that Member States, the Commission and the European Council make very substantive decisions that will have to do with consolidating the economic and geopolitical role of Europe, that will simplify, streamline and develop the role of the capital markets union in particular – the savings and investments union, if you will, but particularly the capital markets union. And we’ll have to continue to sustain the effort of making Europe a place where the rule of law is respected and where a contract is a contract so that there is certainty on the part of the investors and of the economic actors that Europe is actually a reliable place of business. So I think it’s not a question that can be responded to with yes or no. It’s a fairly thorough and deep debate that we have touched on during the Governing Council meeting in the last two days, where we strongly feel that we have done our part and will continue to do our part. But we also strongly advocate in the monetary policy statement the role that authorities have to play if we want to develop in that direction, which is a window of opportunity now.

I’ve noticed you’re wearing the “in charge” necklace, if I see correctly. I suppose it was intentional today, but going to my question: with 1.6% inflation projected by next year under your baseline scenario, won’t it warrant more rate cuts for itself regarding it coming from the euro and the energy and regardless of the outcome of the trade war? And I also wanted to ask about the BBVA-Sabadell merger, which is now being checked by the Spanish ministers. Even though it has the ECB’s green light and the other one of the competition authorities, do you fear that political opposition to mergers could hamper the advances on the banking union?

I hope you don’t mind if I ask my colleague, Vice-President and friend Luis de Guindos to address the latter part. I will turn the floor over to you and I’ll come back to you afterwards.

Vice-President: As you have said, we produced our report and we released our report. I think that it was almost one year ago. And now the antitrust authorities in Spain have given their opinion and the remedies that they have imposed for the deal. According to Spanish law, the government has the possibility to analyse the conditions imposed and, according to the general interest, to modify these conditions. As you can imagine, we can wait. We should wait until we have a definitive opinion from the Spanish government. Otherwise what we would be making is a sort of speculation, which I think doesn’t make much sense in this moment of time.

President: And on your first question, I just want to remind you that our forecast is 2% inflation in 2025, 1.6% in 2026 and 2% in 2027. And our core inflation is even more stable than that. It’s 2.4% in 2025, 1.9% in 2026 and 1.9% in 2027. Of course, you think 1.6% in 2026, but that’s exactly part of the assessment that has been produced by staff. And if you look at what other institutions have forecasted, it’s at the very low end of the range for 2027. And that’s also because they take into account the most recent data available, not including the first quarter, because I think the first quarter will give us some surprises. But if you compare headline inflation and core inflation, you can see exactly where the difference lies, and that is energy prices and the value of the euro. We also have inflation – both headline and core – returning to 2%, or 1.9% for core in 2027, and the 25-basis-point cut of today is deliberately taking care of that inflation path. So we are confident of the analysis of our staff on that basis. And as I said, we will do what is necessary in order to make sure that that inflation stays at our 2% target. Monetary policy will be appropriately determined on that basis. But as I said, we are very well-positioned.

I’m also going to ask about inflation. The narrative of the past several post-pandemic years is higher for longer – structurally higher inflation – for all of these different reasons. And looking both at the core and the headline forecast and your expectation potentially for a structurally stronger euro, is that still the expectation: higher for longer for inflation and for rates? And then my second question is also about the euro: whenever the euro goes up, people worry about how that’s going to impact exporters and some of these export-dependent economies. I’m curious if you think the eurozone is strong enough now for a strong euro.

When I look around and reflect on the work that we have done in the last six years, we have a very solid labour market, where participation has – including most recently – increased, where we have been at a rock bottom unemployment rate ever since the euro was created and where the fears of recession that abounded only about a year ago have not materialised. We are forecasting 0.9, 1.1, 1.3 percentage points with very limited revision to growth. The output gap closes at the end of our projection horizon. Wages have increased over the course of those years, particularly with a view to catching up with the lost purchasing power that citizens had suffered as a result of inflation. But it is now decelerating, just in line and in time, I would say, to deliver on our 2% medium-term target. The monetary policy is transmitting quite smoothly to the economy. Credit is up. It could be further and higher up, but credit is up. Rates are transmitting, including to corporates and mortgages. So I would say that the economy is responding quite well to our monetary policy and is delivering on that front. I would add, as I did in response to one of your colleagues earlier, that more needs to be done. And what we have seen – the Vice-President and I – when participating in the finance ministers meetings in Brussels, whether it’s Ecofin or Eurogroup or on the occasion of Paschal Donohoe, the President of the Eurogroup, when he had dinner with us a couple of nights ago, is that we perceive a serious momentum to improve, to change, to simplify, to streamline and to encourage and welcome capital into Europe. And we are seeing it. The reverse Yankee bonds significant increase that we have seen in the last few weeks is a clear indication that there is trust in our system. The capital flow that we are seeing as well, whether it is European investment returning to Europe or a bit of non-European investment coming to Europe. All that is an indication that at least market forces and investors – those who move real money around – actually see value and have confidence in Europe. So that that would be my answer to you. On your second question, I’m not sure what you meant by higher for longer, because I think I have gone out of my way to say that we are in a good place and we are well-positioned now and that we will be assessing, meeting-by-meeting on the basis of data, what, if anything, needs to be done in terms of appropriate monetary policy to return us to the 2% medium-term target. So I think that really brings together the discussions that we’ve had over the last two days.